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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines performances of PKS in the last 2009 
election, West Java and DKI Jakarta gubernatorial elections and 
the current 2014 legislative election to answer whether PKS looses 
or survives their political support from Indonesian people in the 
2014 election. Although the cadre of PKS is still solid compare to 
that of other parties, there are a variety of reasons why the 
popularity of PKS slightly declined in the 2014 election compared 
to that of 2009 election.  The involvement of the former president 
of PKS, Luthfi Hasan Ishak, in the case of beef graft has lessened 
the confidence of Indonesian people to the integrity of PKS in 
eradicating corruption in Indonesia. Thus, many Indonesians have 
doubt and less confidence in the capacity of PKS to solve other 
national problems. In addition, the weak and the least possible 
figure of PKS to be nominated as a president candidate is another 
reason why PKS cannot become a champion in the 2014 
presidential election. Looking at the quick count result done by 
several survey institutions, however, PKS is considered to be 
survived in the 2014 election. They successfully maintain and 
strengthen their cadres’ solidity. Their leading figures were quite 
successful in rebuilding trust not only for their loyal cadres but 
also public in general that they are really ‘clean’ and ‘professional’ 
and ready to combat corruption in the country. PKS proved to the 
public that the case of their former president was ‘the only 
corruption case’ done by ‘personally individual’ (oknum) whom 
they will not tolerate.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Indonesian general election has been conducted successfully on April 9, 
2014. Some argue that 2013-2014 are ‘years of politics’ in which every 
political party not only contends to gain supports from the people but also 
‘captives’ one another. In fact, the 2014 elections, both for the parliament 
and president, are very crucial. It is the fourth parliamentary election since 
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the authoritarian Soeharto regime out of office, and the third direct election 
for president. 
General Election Commission (KPU) has passed 12 political parties 
in a screening process that has seen the overall field drop from the 48 
parties which took part in the first democratic elections in 1999 to 24 in 
2004, and then back to 38 in 2009. Nine are the parties currently 
represented in the House of Representatives and the others three are the 
National Democrat Party (Nasdem), Crescent Star Party (PBB) and 
Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI). The nine parties in the House 
are the Democratic Party, Golkar Party, Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Struggle (PDI-P), Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), National Mandate Party 
(PAN), United Development Party (PPP), National Awakening Party 
(PKB), Great Indonesia Party (Gerindra), and People’s Conscience Party 
(Hanura). 
With only twelve parties contest and only four political parties 
considered to be Islamic, several analysts argue that because they will be 
less confused by the proliferation of choices, voters are able to pay closer 
attention to party policies. Thus, in this Indonesian vibrant emerging 
democracy, several questions remained unsolved: how were the Islamic 
political parties’ performance in the election? Did Islamic political parties 
gain huge support from the people or conversely? These questions are 
important to be answered because several findings of survey institutions 
before the election have predicted the declining popularity of Islamic 
political parties in the coming election. Was their prediction correct and 
come to a reality?  
Based on the above background, this paper tries to answer and prove 
whether Islamic political parties, particularly PKS, ended as predicted by 
survey institution or conversely. Does PKS still have a bright future in the 
coming presidential election? And what do the impacts of (declining or 
increasing Islamic parties) in the general election to the presidential 
election? 
To answer the above questions, this paper firstly describes a solidity 
of PKS in maintaining their cadres. Some argue that PKS is the only true 
cadre party in the country. The discussion is followed by analyzing PKS’s 
performance in the 2009 election, their performances in gubernatorial 
elections both in West Java and Jakarta provinces and their performance in 
2014 election to measure whether PKS still has a chance to survive or even 
become a champion in the coming 2014 presidential election.   
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
This study was conducted prior to and one week post 2014 legislative 
election. While for the prior election, the data is based for the most part on 
interviews that have been conducted with main figures of political parties 
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post 2009 election and after the gubernatorial elections in West Java and 
DKI Jakarta. To update the current 2014 election, the data was collected 
using quick count reports done by several survey institutions such as 
Lingkaran Survey Indonesia (LSI), Indikator Politik Indonesia (IPI), Cyrus 
Network-CSIS, Lembaga Survey Nasional (LSN) and Jaringan Survey 
Indonesia (JSI).  
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
A.  Is PKS A Solid-Cadre Party? 
PKS declares itself as a dakwah1 and party of cadres.  In an official 
document of the party, the first PKS President, Nur Mahmudi Ismail states: 
PKS was established not only for dakwah mission but also proposed 
to be a vehicle for political education for Muslim and other 
Indonesians. Well organized, a disciplined and strict cadre training 
and sympathetic approaches to the community are main 
characteristics of the party.2 
 
Ismail’s statement above shows that PKS is not only a party of 
cadres as was claimed by Fealy, who says that PKS is the only true party of 
cadres in Indonesia.3 Anis Matta, the current Secretary General of PKS 
comments on the characteristics of his party saying that: “PKS adalah 
gabungan antara apa yang kita sebut dengan Nukhbawiyah Jamahiriyah, 
gerakan elit dan massa (PKS is a combination of what we call an elite and a 
mass movement).”4 This means that PKS is a combination of cadre and 
mass party at the same time. PKS believes that in the process of the 
resurgence of the Islamic community, Muslims need a qualified, collective 
leadership. In this context, an Islamic party in Indonesia, like PKS, can play 
a role to train cadres to become qualified leaders trusted by the community 
to lead the country in the future. Matta says: 
PKS holds a principle that a leader will perform well if he is 
supported by a strong mass base. If the relationship between elites 
and mass supporters is strong, it is hard for a political conspiracy to 
break cohesiveness between elites and their supporters because 
during the process of governing the state various challenges may 
occur.5 
                                                
1Dakwah or Islamic preaching literally means “to invite people.” This is mainly intended to deliver Islamic 
teachings, like Quranic interpretations, H{adi>th (Prophet Muhammad’s speech and acts) and Islamic laws to the 
people. 
2 Sekretariat Jenderal DPP PKS Bidang Arsip dan Sejarah, Sikap Kami: Kumpulan Sikap Dakwah Politik 
PK dan PKS Periode 1998-2005 (Bandung: Harakatuna Publishing, 2007), 122. 
3See Fealy’s argument in his preface to Yon Machmudi, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Wajah Baru Islam Politik 
Indonesia (Bandung: Harakatuna, 2005), vi.  
4Aay Muhamad Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis Politik Kaum Muda Muslim 
Indonesia Kontemporer (Jakarta: Teraju, 2004), 206. 
5 Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 206. 
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As the party prepares qualified cadres to become leaders in the 
future, PKS’s members must know the ideology of the party and cannot buy 
their way through a patronage network. PKS also has its own special cadre 
recruitment, training and selection process. This liqa>’ (weekly ideological 
gathering) training has resulted in a loyal and committed membership. This 
typology of party as dakwah and a cadre-based party is also confirmed by 
the former president of PKS, Hidayat Nur Wahid. Wahid also insists that 
although PKS is a cadre party, it is a non-sectarian and open party, which 
allows all Indonesian people, whatever his or her religious beliefs, to be 
eligible to become party members. He further says: 
I should add one point.  When I talk about the Indonesian people, I 
don’t think only about Muslims.  PK(S) is an open party.  I have 
been on panels with various kinds of people: Catholic philosophers 
such as Franz Magnis-Suseno, Romo Mudji Sutrisno, and Muslim 
scholars like Cak Nur [late Nurcholish Madjid] and Hasyim Muzadi 
[Chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama] and others.  Many Christian fellows 
have told me that they like PK(S).  Some have even asked if they, as 
non-Muslims, can join PK(S).  I’ve replied that PK(S) has never 
required its members to be Muslims.  All it requires is that they are 
Indonesians and that they are over 17 years old.  So, if Christians are 
interested they can join us.  But they should realize that we are a 
cadre-based party, in which we have cadre programmes for our 
members.  We will give them training.6 
 
 Wahid’s argument that his party is open and non-sectarian could 
also be seen from the party’s official platform. In its Anggaran Rumah 
Tangga, Partai Keadilan (before transforming itself to PKS) Chapter 2, 
article 8 about its membership, it explains seven requirements to become 
PKS members. None of these requirements restrict its members to only 
Muslims, or only males or only certain ethnic groups. The requirements to 
be party members are stated to be: (1) Indonesian citizens: male or female, 
(2) over 17 years old or married, (3) of good behavior, (4) in agreement with 
the party’s objectives, (5), officially apply to became a party member to its 
headquarter office through Dewan Pimpinan Daerah (District Officers), (6) 
practicing and concern with membership obligations and (7) who declare to 
be loyal to the party’s principles and platforms.7 After PK was transformed 
into PKS, the party’s Anggaran Dasar Chapter 3, article 7, on memberships 
also says: “All Indonesian citizens who have fulfilled requirements and 
agreed with the party platform are eligible to become members of Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera.” 
                                                
6Hidayat Nur Wahid, “Power Means Serving Others,” Van Zorge Report (March 18, 2002): 7. 
7DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Sekilas Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Jakarta: 1998), 64. 
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 Non-Muslim members and supporters are also well accommodated 
by PKS. This argument could be seen from the significant numbers of 
supporters who voted for PKS during the 2004 general election. According 
to a voter survey during the 2004 election period made by an Indonesian 
NGO, the Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan 
Sosial (LP3ES),8 PKS supporters then were mostly young, middle-income, 
educated Muslims. Nearly 99 per cent of the PKS voters were Muslim, 
though the one percent of Hindu and Christian voters was a notable 
achievement for a party once so defined by its Islamist goals. With regards 
to a minority group, it is important to note here a statement from the 
current PKS President, Tifatul Sembiring when he was asked his opinion on 
minority groups: 
If once PKS was given an opportunity to rule the country 
(Indonesia), PKS would shelter and protect all ethnic groups, not 
only Muslim. Because the prophet Muhammad has always said that 
whoever offends a person of a different faith will become my enemy 
in the hereafter. All citizens will have equal rights. It is even not a 
problem for PKS to have a non-Muslim president if he/she was 
elected democratically by Indonesian people. Since most of 
Indonesian people are Muslim, and through a direct presidential 
election, it is more likely that Muslim would be elected as 
president.9 
 
Another surprising finding of the LP3ES survey above was that 
nearly 20 per cent of voters categorized their occupation as “housewife,” a 
larger proportion than student voters. Evidently, the PKS platform for a 
clean and caring government, combined with the party’s large percentage of 
female politicians, hit home with women voters. From these findings one 
also could argue that women’s political interests are well accommodated by 
this PKS Islamic party. My direct observation as a participant in the protest 
rally held by PKS convinced me of the survey findings of LP3ES. It can be 
seen from the fact that more than half of the protestors were females who 
even brought their children. These mothers said that their children are the 
next generation of political activists. 
The LP3ES survey above also showed that nearly 50 per cent of 
PKS voters were between the ages of 23 and 35, and the majority had a 
significantly higher level of education than the average supporter of other 
                                                
8Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES) or Institute for Social and 
Economic Research, Education & Information is a Non-Government Organization (NGO), which is non-profit and 
autonomous. It was founded by a group of intellectuals and student activists on August 19, 1971. Its formation 
was sparked by the felt need for developing alternative thinking for national development. For more detail of this 
organization, see www.lp3es.or.id (accessed August 9, 2013). 
9See Jawa Pos, July 26, 2005.  
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Indonesian parties. On one occasion, Tifatul Sembiring (a current PKS 
President) stated that more than eighty per cent of PKS cadres hold 
university degrees. Yet, what was missing from Sembiring’s statement was 
the fact that, based on my interviews with the members of PKS in the 
district levels like Depok, Bogor and Kuningan, I found that almost one 
hundred percent of the party’s ‘generators’ were university students who 
actively build their network with students from the Senior High Schools in 
Indonesia. This party’s core groups with their own style also influenced 
their parents and other family members to become PKS supporters in the 
election  
The PKS believes that its future political success stems from 
today’s younger generation. The quality of the cadres and their integration 
into the party are very important for PKS development. Thus, the selection 
of individuals is based on two main criteria: the ability to adapt to a 
concept of ‘life-long education’ and continual personal development, and 
on the ability to maintain a spiritual and truly Islamic dimension in political 
activism.  An important part of the process of life-long education is the 
ability to accept constructive criticism and feedback from others as a way 
towards personal improvement. This means that in the PKS, every member 
is given equal opportunity to become the best members of the party and at 
the end they will be chosen as top candidates from the party for either 
national or local parliamentary elections. Because of the process of life-long 
education and training of the cadres in internal organization, the PKS could 
be seen as a party that initiated the transmission of democratic values into 
its constituents.  
In the process of cadre training and recruitment, the PKS plays its 
role as a political party that educates its members on how the political and 
democratic rules should be followed to achieve their goals. In this matter, it 
could be argued that PKS functions as an agent of transmission of 
democracy’s values to Indonesian people, or at least to their cadres and 
constituents. The PKS believes that integrated and well educated cadres, 
who understand the party platform, and the nature of political rules in 
Indonesia, might help to influence the Indonesian people in general to 
follow democratic rule.  For PKS, to build Indonesia as a prosperous, 
developed and democratic country, it is necessary to start with the smallest 
unit of community that is the person as an individual. A good individual 
will lead to establish a good family. A good family will produce a good 
community and finally will create a good nation. Thus it could be argued 
that for PKS, the smallest unit of a nation or state is a person as an 
individual not villages-community as was commonly perceived by 
philosophers such as Aristotle. The official document of PKS says: 
To have a qualified cadre, it is necessary to have a special and step 
by step training. Step by step training started with creating a strong 
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individual because it will produce a good family. Good family will 
lead to create a good community. Good family and community will 
produce a good life environment. Because to establish a good state 
require good individuals and society that can be trusted to take 
responsibility to govern, creating a good and strong individual is 
necessary.10  
 
PKS believes that to create a good nation should start from a small 
structure that is an individual then a family. This argument seems to be 
based on the Quranic verse that says: 
Allah does not change a people's lot unless they change what is in 
their hearts. But when (once) Allah willeth a people's punishment, 
there can be no turning it back, nor will they find, besides Him, any 
to protect.11 
 
The success of PKS in recruiting and training its cadre could be seen 
from the increasing number of its loyal cadres from only 33,000 in 1999 to 
500,000 in 2004 and more than one million controllable cadres in 2009. 
Tifatul Sembiring (former president of PKS) says that his party’s target is 
to have 2.5 million loyal cadres prior to the general election in 2014. This 
target is realistic because PKS has a very intensive cadre training and 
recruitment whose success has been proven.12   
Intensive Cadre Training (Liqa>’)13 
The history of PKS’s establishment cannot be separated from early 
dakwah and tarbiyah movements in Indonesia back in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The dakwah movement in its early stage was only popular among university 
students and was known as the tarbiyah movement. However, it quickly 
spread among middle-class Indonesians, particularly after the alumni of 
tarbiyah groups in leading universities got their permanent jobs. They kept 
up their tarbiyah activities and recruitment in the places where they 
worked. One of the characteristics of this movement was the creation of a 
small discussion group (h}alaqah) consisting of five to twelve members, to 
study Islamic teaching intensively. This kind of group was very popular in 
leading secular universities in Indonsia such as Universitas Indonesia (UI 
Jakarta), Sekolah Tinggi Akuntansi Negara (STAN Jakarta), Universitas 
Gadjah Mada (UGM Yogyakarta), Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB 
                                                
10 DPP Partai Keadilan, Sekilas Partai Keadilan (Jakarta: 1998 ), 12. 
11 Quran Chapter 13: 11. 
12See Media Indonesia, July 26, 2005. 
13Liqa> (ﻲﻘﻟ) literally means “meeting.” This term is taken from the Arabic and used by PKS members to refer 
to weekly gatherings consisting of small groups (5-12 persons) to learn Islamic studies under the guidance of 
more senior and qualified Islamic teachers of PKS members called murabbi>. Although generally they discuss 
Islamic teachings in this gathering, it is also used as a tool to strengthen cadre relationships among the party 
members. 
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Bandung), Institut Pertanian Bogor (IPB Bogor), Institut Keguruan dan 
Ilmu Pendidikan (IKIP now UNJ Jakarta), Trisakti University Jakarta and 
other universities in Indonesia. The h}alaqah has succeeded in attracting 
university students to join the group. Students mostly with a non-Islamic 
studies background seem to find spiritual guidance in the h}alaqah. Their 
transitional personality from teenagers to becoming adult seems to 
encourage them to join this type of group. The h}alaqah groups approach 
university students, both male and female alike, persuasively and politely 
and this enables the groups to have big followings and become a 
mainstream movement in the universities mentioned above. 
When the tarbiyah movement was transformed into the Islamic 
party called PKS, both university students and alumni actively involved in 
the tarbiyah movement now became the active members of the party and 
continued to use the h}alaqah style in recruiting and maintaining their 
members. They even further created what it called Multi Level Dakwah 
(MLD) which seems to be similar to the Multi Level Marketing (MLM) 
approach in business. The principle of this MLD was that each member 
should intensively approach their families or friends to participate firstly in 
h}alaqah activities and in the end attract them to join the party. This 
approach is also known as the cell theory of recruitment. 
Strategies have been applied by PKS not only to spread out and 
recruit new members but also to maintain and develop their members’ 
loyalty to the party by making regular cadre training such as liqa>’ and 
muqayyam as part of h}alaqah and tarbiyah movements. Further, the PKS 
has implemented two pillars of their tarbiyah movement, which are straight 
manhaj14 and qualified murabbi>.15 While a leader of h}alaqah is called 
murabbi>, the members themselves are called mutarabbi> (guided students). 
Liqa>’ and muqayyam have been selected as good training to create solid and 
qualified cadres of PKS. 
In the h}alaqah or liqa>’ program, PKS provides special curricula 
consisting of planning activities and materials that should be taught by 
murabbi> to h}alaqah members. This curriculum was set up by the party, 
particularly by their division on cadres called Departemen Kaderisasi. For 
new members of PKS, a h}alaqah guideline is called Manajemen Tarbiyah 
Anggota Pemula (Tarbiyah Management for Beginner Members). In this 
guideline, the party set its tarbiyah curriculum as well. The curriculum 
covers four materials, which are 1) basic teachings of Islamic studies; 2) 
basic teachings of skills and self empowerment, 3) dakwah and Islamic 
thoughts, and 4) social sciences. 
                                                
14Manhaj is taken from Arabic word literally meaning systematic steps to be followed to achieve an 
objective. Straight manhaj here refers to steps or programs that have been done and exemplified by the prophet 
Muhammad in his dakwah. 
15Murabbi > is taken from Arabic literally means an educator. It then refers to a leader in a group discussion 
(h}alaqah) who guides their members in Islamic teachings. 
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Student Networking Overseas 
To maintain the integrity of the members who are living or studying 
overseas and to expand its cadre membership, the PKS also maintains an 
international network. It is very common to see how PKS cadres, who are 
studying overseas, keep up their h}alaqah or tarbiyah activities. Different 
from other parties in Indonesia, the PKS has their branch overseas called 
PIP-PKS or Pusat Informasi dan Pelayanan PKS (The Information and 
Service Center of PKS). The PIP-PKS is not only involved in maintaining 
their cadres’ mutual relations by performing liqa>’ and other such activities, 
but is also active in disseminating PKS programs and ideas to Indonesians--
students and workers alike--living overseas. The PIP-PKS can be found in 
Australia and New Zealand, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Egypt, United 
Kingdom and South America.16 
 
Big Family and Polygamy 
Although I cannot find any official documents of the party stating 
that PKS cadres should have a lot of children to increase the numbers of 
cadres and members, it is clear from almost all members of PKS I have met 
and interviewed, that they have or are planning to have as many children as 
they can. During the rally protests that I attended, as is also well known by 
the Indonesian public, PKS members would happily bring their children or 
even babies to come along with their parents, attending the rally protest 
organized by the party. 
The following data on the number of children that parliament 
members from PKS have seem to support the argument that PKS members 
are more likely to have big family to fulfill their agenda of enlarging the 
numbers of cadres and members. I found that eighty two per cent (thirty 
seven out of forty five parliament members) from PKS have four children or 
more and only eighteen percent have two children or less.  The general 
norm in Indonesia for numbers of children is having no more than three 
children. The data also show that the highest number of children of any 
PKS parliament member is thirteen, and this record is held by a female 
member, Yoyoh Yusroh. There are three female parliament members from 
PKS, namely, Yoyoh Yusroh (thirteen children), Aan Rohanah (eight 
children) and Nursanita Nasution (seven children). For PKS members, it is 
important to have huge numbers of children because they believe that 
family members could become the main pillar of cadres of the party.  
Besides the idea of having big families, it is commonly assumed by 
Indonesian people that one of the PKS strategies to expand their 
                                                
16Based on my observation in Kuala Lumpur during my fieldwork and in Singapore, these international 
networks are solid and have several activities to promote PKS’s programs and to attract overseas Indonesian 
voters. 
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membership is through polygamy. It is publicly known that practicing 
polygamy is popular among PKS cadres. According to Darol Mahmada, 
“Sementara sudah jadi rahasia umum kalau ikhwan partai ini (PKS) lazim 
melaksanakan praktek polygamy dengan tujuan untuk perluasan dakwah 
Islam”17 (It is no secret that it is common for PKS member to practice 
polygamy in order to expand their Islamic dakwah activity.) Although it is 
hard to get an official PKS document which states that polygamy is one of 
their strategies to expand their membership, the practice of polygamy 
among members of PKS particularly among leading figures of the party, is 
well known publicly. Several leading figures of the party who practiced 
polygamy are, for example, Tifatul Sembiring (President of the party), M. 
Anis Matta (Secretary General of the party), Hilmi Aminudiin (Head of 
Majlis Syuro PKS), Didin Amiruddin (Deputy Treasury of PKS) and 
Zulkieflimansyah (Parliament Member from PKS). 
From the above explanation, we can say that PKS has a very 
intensive cadre’s recruitment and trainings to enlarge membership and 
maintain their solidity. Thus, it is safe to argue that if we look at their 
solidity, it is understandable if PKS could have a huge support in the 
election. However, the questions are remained that to have a successful 
performance in the election, a solid cadre is not the only factor. The 
experience of PKS in the 2009 election which will be discussed below could 
proof this argument. 
 
B.  Experience of PKS in 2009 Election 
The PKS’s consistent adherence to democratic procedures can be seen from 
its continued participation in the last 2009 and forthcoming 2014 
Indonesian elections. The support for PKS in the 2009 election was a 
disappointment for the party. PKS has failed to its ambition to gain at least 
20 per cent of the vote. PKS’s votes only slightly increased from 7.4 per 
cent in 2004 to 7.9 per cent in 2009. 
The dynamics of the political situations Indonesia have influenced 
the performance of PKS in the last elections. The popularity of Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidency has paved the way for Partai Demokrat 
(Democratic Party) to become the most successful party that has managed 
to gain 20.9 per cent of the votes in 2009. Yudhoyono’s party defeated 
other big and established parties like the Golkar Party and the PDIP, Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Struggle). Golkar, the most powerful party during Soeharto’s era, dropped 
to only 14.5% compared to 21.6% of votes in 2004 election, and PDIP’s 
Megawati party fell from 18.5% in 2004 to 14.0% in 2009. Although the 
performance of PKS is better in 2009 compared to that of in 2004, the 
                                                
17N. Darol Mahmada, “Nabi Itu Monogami,” Gatra, December 5, 2007. 
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performance of Islamic parties declined from 38.1% in 2004 to 27.8% in 
2009.18 A detailed explanation of factors that contributed to PKS’s relative 
failure in 2009 is provided below. 
PKS Survival in 2009 Election? 
 The performance of Islamic political parties in the 2009 Indonesian 
election has attracted many comments from political analysts. The election 
shows the decline in support for Islamic parties except for PKS. Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa (Party of National Awakening) dropped from 10.6% in 
2004 to 4.9% in 2009. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Depelopment 
Party) dropped from 8.1% to 5.3%, and other two Islamic parties Partai 
Bulan Bintang (PBB) and Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR) failed to pass 
the 2.5% electoral threshold. PKS won about 7.9 per cent of votes and thus 
stood at the fourth rank after Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party and other two 
secular parties, Golkar and PDIP. One could argue that PKS just managed 
to survive in the 2009 election. 
 
Table 1: 2004 and 2009 Indonesian Elections Result  
Party 2004 2009 
 % of total 
votes 
No. of 
Seats 
% of total 
votes 
No. of 
Seats 
Golkar Party 21.6 128 14.4 108 
PDIP 18.5 109 14.0 93 
PKB 10.6 52 4.9 26 
PPP 8.1 58 5.3 39 
Partai Demokrat 7.4 57 20.80 148 
PKS 7.3 45 7.9 59 
PAN 6.4 52 6.0 42 
Gerindra -- -- 4.5 30 
Hanura -- -- 3.8 15 
PDS 2.13    
Source: Adopted from the General Election Commission (KPU) 
 
 The failure of PKS to reach its target to at least gain 20% voters in 
the election was mostly due to external factors, mainly the popularity of 
Yudhoyono and his Democratic Party. The incumbent government under 
Yudhoyono presidency won a significant victory. Corruption becomes an 
important issue in the 2009 Indonesian election. Yudhoyono was perceived 
by Indonesians as ‘a hero’ who campaigned extensively for anti-corruption. 
During his first term in office, to combat corruption in Indonesia, 
Yudhoyono established two institutions, Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi 
(Corruption Eradication Commission) and Pengadilan Tindak Pidana 
Korupsi (Corruption Court).  
                                                
18 Marcus Mietzner, Indonesia’s 2009 Elections: Populism, Dynasties and the Consolidation of the Party 
System, Lowy Institute for International Policy, (Sydney 2009): 12. 
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Another factor in Yudhoyono’s success was his introduction of 
massive cash programs for the poor known as Bantuan Langsung Tunai 
(BLT) or Direct Cash handouts programs to help poor people in the 
country. Mietzner notes that the ruling government spent US$2 billion 
between June 2008 and April 2009 (almost one year before the election). 
Yudhoyono’s campaign was the government’s compensation for the poor 
after his government had increased fuel prices.19 
Besides the popularity of the Yudhoyono’s government, Noorhaidi 
highlights three internally-driven factors that contributed to the 
disappointing result of PKS: wrong campaign strategy, failure to attract 
swing voters, and failure to portray itself as an outsider and reformist 
party.20  
PKS’s campaign to strengthen its image as a moderate Islamist 
party open to all segments of Indonesian society, both Muslim and non-
Muslim, was a failure. PKS failed in its attempt to attract their non-cadre 
constituents although it offered a pluralist orientation to voters. Its 
approach even seems to be to lessen their support from both Muslim and 
non-Muslim alike. On the one hand, for Muslim voters, PKS’s lesser 
emphasis on Islamic ideology made them curious about whether PKS had 
abandoned its Islamic agenda. For non-Muslims, on the other hand, this 
campaign was considered as only a rhetorical tactic or political strategy to 
attract voters to PKS.  
The PKS campaign in printed media and television that praised 
Soeharto as ‘a national hero’ also contributed to its decline. While some 
saw this campaign as an opportunistic and pragmatic maneuver of PKS, 
others saw this pro-Soeharto move as making it difficult for PKS to stand 
on their own position as a reformist party.21 
The PKS also failed to repeat its success in attracting the swing 
voters, as it did in 2004. According to Mietzner, significant electoral swing 
voters during the 2009 election have benefited the secular parties, 
particularly the Democratic Party. The decision of several Muslim socio-
religious organization to join a variety of parties has also contributed to the 
decline of Islamic parties like PKS.22 PKS move to join Yudhoyono’s ruling 
government (2004-2009) also brought another disadvantage for it. On the 
one hand, when the government was praised by the people for its success, it 
was easily claimed as the success of Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party, 
instead of PKS. On the other hand, by joining the government, it was 
                                                
19 Marcus Mietzner, Indonesia’s 2009 Elections: Populism, Dynasties and the Consolidation of the Party 
System, Lowy Institute for International Policy, (Sydney 2009): 4. 
20 Noorhaidi Hasan, “Islamist Party, Electoral Politics and Da’wa Mobilization among Youth: The 
Prosperious Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia, RSIS Working Paper, Rajaratnam School of International Studies 
(Singapore 2009): 20-21. 
21 Mietzner, Indonesia’s 2009 Elections, 14. 
22 Mietzner, Indonesia’s 2009 Elections, 15. 
ISLAMIC PARTY SURVIVES IN 2014 LEGISLATIVE ELECTION? (THE CASE OF PKS) 
 
ISLAMIKA INDONESIANA, 1:1 (2014) 45 
difficult for PKS to keep its image as an outsider party committed to total 
reform that had made it popular in the 2004 election. 
PKS participation in the 2009 election provided us with some 
indicators in measuring the commitment of PKS to uphold democratic 
principles in achieving their objectives. The discussion above shows how 
the local political issues that appeared prior to the elections in the country 
greatly influenced the electoral performance of the party. The ruling 
government was portrayed by the people as a successful in combating 
corruption in the country, which made it difficult for PKS and other parties 
to compete with the ruling party. There was no alternative Indonesian 
political leader who could rival Yudhoyono’s popularity and provide 
powerful leadership for the opposition. While Yudhoyono cannot be 
nominated for the third term of presidency, how would it impact to the 
performance of PKS in 2014 election? 
 
C.  The Prediction of Survey Institution Prior to 2014 
Election 
The latest survey done by Indonesian Survey Circle (LSI) showed that the 
performance of Islamic political parties including PKS in the coming 
election would be worse than previous elections. LSI found that if the 
election is held in the present days, none of the major Islamic political 
parties would remain among the top five parties. There will be no single 
Islamic parties got more than five percent of the voters.  
Another survey institution like the National Survey Institute (LSN) 
found that not only support for the Islamic parties decline but also for the 
Islamic politicians. The survey done by LSN revealed low support for 
specific politicians from Islamic parties, such as Hidayat Nur Wahid (PKS), 
Hatta Rajasa (PAN), Muhaimin Iskandar (PKB) and Suryadharma Ali 
(PPP). 
The above trends, according to Umar S Bakry (executive director of 
LSN), shows that it is not impossible that Islamic parties’ performance like 
PKS will even drop deeper in the 2014 elections.  
There are a variety of reasons for the declining popularity of Islamic 
political parties including PKS. LSI mentioned several factors which lead to 
the slide in support for Islamic political parties. 
First, Indonesians may have doubt and less confidence in the 
capacity of Islamic parties to solve national problems compare to that of 
secular nationalist parties. For example, the problem of massive corruption 
cases in the country which is considered by Indonesian people as the first 
‘illness’ that the country should eliminate, can not be solved by Islamic 
parties and Muslim politicians. The involvement of the former president of 
PKS, Luthfi Hasan Ishak, in the case of beef graft allegation has lessened 
the confidence of Indonesian people to the integrity of PKS in eradicating 
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corruption in Indonesia. The arrest of PKS chairman Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq is 
a body blow for the party and will adversely affect its chances in 2014, 
analysts have predicted. Hanta Yuda from the Poll Tracking Institute, for 
example, said: that the PKS must search for other issues than 
anticorruption, because the public will no longer trust in its massive 
campaigns against it. Just like the Democratic Party, the PKS will 
automatically be associated with corruption after the investigation of 
Luthfi. The same as hanta Yuda, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, a political analyst 
with the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI), said: 
PKS was facing an existential crisis. “This case will also disorient 
party members, who have long had the impression that their leaders 
have been working very hard for them.”23 
 
The finding of Lembaga Survei Jakarta (LSJ) who held their survey 
on 9-15 February 2013 after the arrest of Luthfi Hasan Ishak also showed 
that only 6,9 percent among 1.225 respondents who will vote for 
Democratic Party in 2014 election and only 2,6 percent who will vote for 
PKS. According to Igor, a researcher from LSJ, the case of beef graft has 
impacted in declining trust of people to the PKS jargon as a clean party. 
Only 15,7 percent of respondent still believe that PKS is still a clean party, 
66 percent did not believe anymore and 18,3 percent of respondents 
answered do not know.24 In addition, the fact that the popularity of Islamic 
political party, likes PKS decreases, has also proved that the phenomenon 
of Islam Yes, Islamic Political Parties No, is now seemed to be 
mushrooming and strengthening among Indonesian Muslims’ belief. If this 
jargon promoted by Nurcholish Madjid in 1960s-1970s, was only ‘a moral 
call’, it is currently becoming a political reality. Indonesian people seem to 
believe that there is no difference between Islamic and nationalist parties in 
combating corruption in the country.  
Second, Islamic political parties are commonly known to have a 
funding problem. Eighty five percents of the respondent, according to LSI, 
argue that Islamic parties including PKS are weaker in terms of funding 
resources compare to secular nationalist parties. Compare to nationalist 
parties such as Golkar, PDIP, Hanura, Gerindra and Nasdem, one would 
agree that Islamic parties such as PKS and PBB are very weak in term of 
their funding to face the coming 2014 election. 
Third, the cases of radicalism in the name of religion in Indonesia 
have also led to the decline of Islamic political parties in the country. The 
violence actions done by some groups in the name of Islam have paved the 
                                                
23 The Jakarta Post, February 1, 2013. 
24 Prayitno Ramlan, “Menang di Pilkada Jabar dan Sumut, PKS Masih hebat atau Tersesat,” in http//www. 
http://ramalanintelijen.net/?p=6530 (accessed September 10, 2013). 
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way to the ‘collective anxiety’ and declining Islamic political parties’ 
popularity including PKS in the eyes of the public. 
Fourth, secular and nationalist parties seem to be more 
accommodative to the voters’ Islamic aspirations. These secular parties 
have transformed themselves into secular-inclusive parties to accommodate 
the Islamic constituents. Voters with Islamic leanings now have a wider 
choice as they no longer have to depend on the Islamic parties to fight for 
their religious interests. Besides the four reasons above, the weak figure of 
PKS to be nominated as a president candidate and to attract voters outside 
PKS’ cadres is another reason why PKS could not become a champion in 
the 2014 election. 
Although in the coming 2014 election Yudhoyono will not contest 
for his third term, it is not easy for PKS to have an alternative Islamic 
Indonesian political leader who is high in popularity and powerful in 
leadership. The lose of Hidayat Nur Wahid in the Jakarta gubernatorial 
election was the example that the main figure of PKS was not supported by 
the people compare to that of nationalist leaders such as Joko Widodo. If 
Hidayat Nur Wahid, who was considered as one of the leading figures in 
PKS, was lose in the local election, one would assume that he was not 
popular enough to be nominated by PKS in the presidential election. 
The factor of charismatic and popular leader as a significant factor 
in attracting the voters in Indonesia has been proven by the fact when Joko 
Widodo (Jokowi) was elected as a governor of DKI Jakarta in 2012. Based 
on the findings of current several surveys in Indonesia, one would agree that 
for the 2014 election there was no alternative Indonesian political leader 
who could rival Jokowi’s popularity. Jokowi would replace the popularity 
of Yudhoyono who can not be nominated for the presidency in 2014. It is 
hard for Islamic political parties like PKS then to have or to create a figure 
like Jokowi while the election is approaching. 
The West Java gubernatorial election was also strengthening the 
argument that figure is very important to attract the voters. Although PKS 
claimed that they have successful in West Java local election because their 
candidate, incumbent Ahmad Heryawan, was elected for the second term, it 
is publicly known that Heryawan and PKS political machinery were not the 
main factor for their success. The people of West Java believed that 
nomination of Dede Yusuf as a vice governor in the first term of Heryawan 
gubernatorial, was among the significant reason why the pair of Heryawan-
Dede Yusuf has been elected. In addition, the nomination of Dedi Mizwar 
(a popular senior actor) as a vice governor in the last gubernatorial election 
was also the main factor why Heryawan was elected for the second terms. 
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D.  Islamic Parties including PKS are Survivors, Surveys are 
Looser? 
Based on the quick count result done by several survey institutions, the best 
three of political parties in 2014 Indonesian election are PDIP (around 19% 
of the vote), Golkar (14 %) and Gerindra (12 %). Although, these three 
nationalist parties are considered to be the champion of the legislative 2014 
election, some argue that the performance of Islamic parties were not bad. 
PKB (Muslim based mass party) has increased dramatically from only 4 
percent in 2009 election to get around 9 percent in the 2014 election, 
followed by PAN (7 %), PKS (6-7 %) and PPP (6-7 %).  
 
Table 2: Quick Count Result  
No. Party IPI LSI CSIS LSN RRI 
1. PDIP 19,40 % 19,74 % 19,10 % 20,77 % 18,58 % 
2. Golkar 14,43 % 14,59 % 14,44 % 13,58 % 14,64 % 
3. Gerindra 12,30 % 11,78 % 11,80 % 12,35 % 11,46 % 
4. Demokrat 9,74 % 9,12 % 9,60 % 10,65 % 10,26 % 
5. PKB 8,98 % 9,93 % 9,30 % 7,93 % 9,59 % 
6. PAN 7,34 % 7,05 % 7,40 % 7,53 % 7,44 % 
7. PKS 6,91 % 6,59 % 6,98 % 7,32 % 6,74 % 
8. PPP 6,34 % 7,32 % 6,60 % 6,89 % 6,52 % 
9. Nasdem 6,88 % 6,29 % 6,80 % 5,39 % 6,77 % 
10. Hanura 5,47 % 5,28 % 5,40 % 5,10 % 5,48 % 
11. PBB 1,54 % 1,38 % 1,60 % 1,45 % 1,65 % 
12. PKPI 0,94 % 1,02 % 1,10 % 1,04 % 0,94 % 
Source: Adapted from the several sources  
(the website of survey institution and online news). 
 
 From the above table it is clear that Islamic political parties were 
survive enough in the election. The performance of these Islamic parties has 
reversed the prediction of survey institutions prior to 2014 election. For 
example, a survey done by Kompas and Lingkaran Survey Indonesia 
showed that PKB and PKS would not get huge support from the voters. A 
survey conducted by Kompas on January 9, 2014 showed that PKB would 
only get 4,1 to 5,1 percent of the voters. But in a reality, PKB has doubled 
its support up to around 10 percent according to quick count result. In 
addition, the LSI in their last survey released on February 2, 2014 
mentioned that PKS would be one of four parties that could not pass 3 
percent electoral threshold.25  
 The PKS popularity in this current election, one would argue, could 
be considered as a survivor. If many surveys said that PKS would be lucky 
if they can secure more than 5 percent of the vote, after the involvement of 
its former president in beef graft case, the party can secured just below 7 
                                                
25 See Palupi Annisa Auliani, “Partai Politik Berbasis Islam Menjungkirbalikkan Survei,” Kompas, April 10, 
2014. 
ISLAMIC PARTY SURVIVES IN 2014 LEGISLATIVE ELECTION? (THE CASE OF PKS) 
 
ISLAMIKA INDONESIANA, 1:1 (2014) 49 
percent. However, the PKS was failing to reach their optimistic target to 
finish in the top three in the election. Before the election, party’s elites 
believe that PKS could win a quite significant number of the votes. Even, 
the PKS president says: “We are confident that in the remaining 40 days, 
we can achieve much progress. We can do enough to allow us to rank in the 
top three positions, God willing (Insha Allah).”26  
  
CONCLUSION  
From the above explanation, it is secured to argue that Islamic 
political parties, including PKS, are not the looser in the 2014 legislative 
election. PKS particularly has shown that they can maintain and strengthen 
their cadres’ solidity. Their leading figures have successfully rebuilding 
trust not only for their loyal cadres but also public in general that they are 
really ‘clean’ and ‘professional’ and ready to combat corruption in the 
country. PKS has proved to the public that the case of their former 
president was ‘the only corruption case’ done by ‘an oknum’ that they will 
not tolerate.  
Since the presidential election is approaching, PKS should gear up 
their party to build a coalition with other Islamic parties to nominate vice 
president or president in the July 9, 2014 presidential election. After 
surviving in the legislative election, it is a good opportunity for PKS to 
prove that they can play a significant role in the coming presidential 
election. 
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